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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Patrick Ian Rodriguez appeals from the judgment of conviction on four counts of 
sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. On appeal, 
Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that 
the probative value of evidence that he had asked two adult women, a friend of his then-
wife and his then-wife's stepmother, if he could see and / or touch their breasts in 
establishing that his intent with respect to the charged conduct was for sexual 
gratification was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Patrick Ian Rodriguez was charged, by Indictment, with four counts of sexual 
battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. (R., pp.25-27.) The matter 
proceeded to a jury trial at which Mr. Rodriguez's former stepdaughter, K.S., testified 
that, when she was 16 and 17 years old, Mr. Rodriguez touched her breasts and vagina 
on multiple occasions. (Tr., p.188, L.1 - p.209, L.11.) During the alleged incidents of 
breast touching, Mr. Rodriguez purportedly explained that "he wanted to make sure that 
everything was okay, and he wanted to parent [her] in the best way that he knew how 
to." (Tr., p.200, L.15 - p.203, L.25.) During the alleged incidents of vaginal touching, 
Mr. Rodriguez purportedly explained that he was attempting "to parent [her] in the best 
way that he knew how and wanted to take care of me and that he wanted to make sure 
that everything was okay down there and that [her] panties were fitting a little too tight." 
(Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.205, L.5.) At the time of the alleged touching of K.S.'s breasts and 
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vagina she was only wearing a towel, not panties or a bra. (Tr., p.203, Ls.20-22, p.205, 
Ls.11-20.) 
When Mr. Rodriguez was questioned by the police, he acknowledged touching 
K.S.'s breasts, but explained that he had done so for legitimate, non-sexual reasons. 
(State's Exhibit No. 5.) He further explained that, if he touched K.S.'s vagina, any 
contact was accidental and occurred during a check for legitimate, non-sexual 
purposes. (State's Exhibit No. 5.) 
Over Mr. Rodriguez's objection (R., pp.67-68), the State was permitted to present 
testimony from a female friend of his ex-wife that he had requested, on numerous 
occasions, that she "flash" her breasts at him and that she obliged many of those 
requests. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.17 - p.288, L.11.) The State was also permitted, again 
over Mr. Rodriguez's objection (R., pp.67-68), to present the testimony of 
Mr. Rodriguez's ex-wife's stepmother that, on one occasion, he had asked if he could 
touch her breasts or, at least, see them. (Trial Tr., p.302, L.19- p.303, L.19.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Rodriguez guilty of all four counts. (Trial Tr., p.543, 
L.20 - p.545, L.1.) Mr. Rodriguez received concurrent, unified sentences of ten years, 
with two years fixed. (Sent. Tr., p.107, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Rodriguez filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.180.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the probative value of 
the Rule 404(b) evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Concluded That The Probative Value 
Of The Rule 404(b) Evidence Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of 
Unfair Prejudice 
A. Introduction 
The State filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, namely, 
"defendant's prior conduct requesting to see the breasts of Christina 'Stina' Van Dam 
(friend of Stacy Petrich, his then-wife), and Marjorie Petrich (his then [step]mother-in-
law)" which requests he made "in the last three to four years."1 (R., p.48.) The State 
explained that such evidence was necessary to establish that his alleged touching of the 
breasts of the minor victim was for the intent of sexual gratification. (R., p.49.) Defense 
counsel filed a written objection. (R., pp.67-68.) 
At the hearing on the 404(b) evidence, defense counsel argued that the evidence 
was not relevant, and alternatively, "even if there was some scintilla of relevance, the 
probative value of it is so minimal, given the different situations, that 404(3) [sic] keeps it 
out because it is just simply too prejudicial." (Motions Hearing Tr., p.26, Ls.15-20.) The 
district court concluded that the evidence was admissible, reasoning, 
I'm going to grant the motion, and I will allow the evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts coming in as it relates to these two adult women who will 
testify, apparently, that the defendant asked on more than one occasion to 
see the breasts and on one occasion asked to touch the breasts. 
The reason that that's going to come in over a 404(b) objection is that it in 
my view is relevant as to the essential element of intent with respect to 
what are currently listed as Counts 3 and 4 of the current charges. 
1 Trial in this matter occurred in March 2013. The conduct underlying the charges 
purportedly occurred between 2006 and 2008. (R., pp.25-27.) 
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(Motions Hearing Tr., p.31, Ls.1-12.) The district court then balanced the prejudicial 
impact against the probative value, and concluded that, with the use of a limiting 
instruction, it should be admitted. (Motions Hearing Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.12.) 
Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the other 
act evidence substantially outweighed its minimal probative value, and as such, the 
district court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence over his objection. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Review of the district court's balancing of the probative versus prejudicial value of 
404(b) evidence is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). 
When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a three part inquiry to determine whether that discretion was abused. First, 
the district court must have perceived the issue as one of discretion. Second, the 
district court must have acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any applicable legal standards. Third, the district court must have 
reached its decision in an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 
(1989). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Concluded That The Probative 
Value Of The Rule 404(b) Evidence Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The 
Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, in relevant part, provides, "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." 1.R.E. 403. In light of the minimal relevance of the 
evidence, Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
5 
concluded that the relevance of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
In this case, the State presented other acts evidence purportedly to establish 
Mr. Rodriguez's intent, namely that he sought sexual gratification when he touched 
K.S.'s breasts. That evidence consisted of testimony from two adult women who were 
propositioned by Mr. Rodriguez to either show him her breasts or allow him to touch her 
breasts. The incidents occurred in residences during social gatherings when other 
people were in the homes. (Trial Tr., p.287, Ls.2-23, p.299, L.20 - p.303, L.16.) In 
contrast, Mr. Rodriguez's touching of K.S.'s breasts occurred while they were alone at 
the family home (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.9-14), and did not involve a similar overtly sexual 
proposition. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.15-23, p.204, L.18 - p.209, L.8.) In light of the 
significant differences, the relevance of the evidence is incredibly minimal, and leads to 
the inevitable conclusion that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
minimal probative value. See State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 732 (Ct. App. 1991) 
("Because of the similarities between these two incidents, i.e., time, place, opportunity 
and age of the victims, we agree with the district court's determination that the probative 
value of the evidence substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice."). 
In considering the probative value of the evidence, it is worth noting that it cannot 
be disputed that many people, including heterosexual men like Mr. Rodriguez, consider 
a woman's breasts to be sexual objects. See State v. Danes, 543 N.W.2d 658, 661 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) ("A woman's breasts are commonly considered a sexual and 
intimate part of her body.") (citations omitted); I.C. § 18-1507(1 )(c) ("'Erotic fondling' 
means touching a person's ... breasts (if the person is a female), or developing or 
undeveloped breast area (if the person is a female child), for the purpose of real or 
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simulated overt sexual gratification ... ") (emphases added); I.C. § 18-1514(3) ("'Sexual 
conduct' means any act of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical 
contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such 
person be a female, the breast.") (emphasis added); I.C. § 23-614 (prohibiting, in any 
establishment with a liquor license, the "[e]mployment or use of any person, including 
allowing any person on the premises, while such person is unclothed or in such attire, 
costume or clothing as to expose to view any portion of the female breast below the top 
of the areola or of any portion of the pubic hair, anus cleft of the buttocks, vulva or 
genitals.") (emphasis added). 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the State had no trouble arguing that it was 
"common sense" that Mr. Rodriguez's purported contact with K.S.'s genitals "was for the 
specific intent to gratify [his] sexual desires" because "what other reason is there to 
touch her [there]?" (Trial Tr., p.502, Ls.2-14.) It needed no special testimony that 
Mr. Rodriguez had a sexual interest in vaginas. The fact that the State felt the need to 
present evidence that Mr. Rodriguez is, apparently, attracted to developed female 
breasts of adult women in order to show that his contact with K.S.'s breasts was for the 
purpose of gratifying his sexual desires was only minimally relevant, especially in light of 
the State's "common sense" argument with respect to the manual-to-genital contact, 
and the fact that the State advanced a similar common sense argument regarding the 
breast contact, namely, "And, again, there's no other legitimate reason for a stepfather 
to touch his stepdaughter's breasts. There just isn't." (Trial Tr., p.504, Ls.4-14.) 
Unlike the minimal probative value of the evidence, the danger of unfair prejudice 
in admitting the other acts evidence was substantial. One need only consider the fact 
that Mr. Rodriguez was being accused of being unfaithful in his marriage by 
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successfully seeking to view the breasts of one of his wife's close friends on numerous 
occasions and of attempting to engage in sexual contact with his stepmother-in-law. 
While the conduct did not rise to the level of adultery, which is still a crime in Idaho, see 
I.C. 18-6601, it was certainly incredibly prejudicial, especially in light of the relationships 
of the people with whom he engaged, or attempted to engage, in such behavior. The 
other act evidence raises the likelihood that the jury was predisposed to judge 
Mr. Rodriguez more harshly than it would have in the absence of the evidence of his 
bad behavior. 
Given the minimal probative value of the other act evidence and the high danger 
of unfair prejudice, Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
when it concluded that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 2ih day of August, 2014. 
SPEN'~RJ.HAHN 
d~.-State Appellate Public Defender 
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